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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
Amici curiae proffer this brief to highlight to
the Court the extreme importance of the uniform and
clear application of (1) the government's evidentiary
burden of proof when it challenges a prior citizenship
determination, and (2) the standard of review a court
of appeals maintains over a district court's citizenship determination. These questions are tied directly
to the precious right of citizenship, and this Court's
resolution of the circuit split on these issues will
affect countless U.S. citizens, noncitizens, and their
families.
Amicus Florence Immigrant and Refugee
Rights Project ("FIRRP") is a nonprofit legal service
organization providing free legal services to men,
women, and unaccompanied children in immigration
custody in Arizona, where about 10 percent of the
country's immigrant detainees are housed. FIRRP
has represented numerous U.S. citizens who have
been errantly placed in removal proceedings and
detained. FIRRP has also represented and is aware
of numerous U.S. citizens who the government has
errantly deported.
Amicus Thomas & Mack Legal Clinic at the
University of Nevada, Las Vegas, William S. Boyd
School of Law, is an organization that provides pro
bono representation for indigent and vulnerable
individuals. The immigration clinic within the
1

Counsel of record provided both parties with timely
notice of amici's intent to file this brief. The parties' written
consent is on file with the Court Clerk. The parties' counsel did
not author the brief in whole or in part, and no person or entity
outside the organizations and attorney listed on this brief made
a monetary contribution to its preparation or submission.
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Thomas & Mack Legal clinic advocates for noncitizens and immigrant communities through a
variety of methods, including direct legal representation to individuals pursuing relief from deportation.
The clients of both amici will be significantly affected
by this case.
Furthermore, counsel of record is currently litigating a contested U.S. citizenship case in the Ninth
Circuit that requires the application of the standard
of proof and appellate review rules established in
Mondaca-Vega v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 415 (9th Cir.
2015), the decision underlying the Petition for a Writ
of Certiorari. Thus, while amici and counsel of record
have no interest in this particular case, they do have
a direct interest in the legal questions raised in this
matter.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Citizenship in this country is our most basic
right. It is the key that unlocks all the rights contained in the Constitution; citizenship is the right to
have rights. It is also critical to the self-governance
of our Republic. The questions presented in this case
ask the Court to clarify the legal standards at play
when the government seeks to take away its prior,
repeated, albeit nonjudicial, acknowledgement of this
precious right. First, what evidentiary burden must
the government meet when it challenges its prior
acknowledgement of U.S. citizenship? Is "clear and
convincing" evidence necessary, or does the fact that
a "priceless possession" hangs in the balance require
the government to meet a higher burden, that of
"clear, unequivocal, and convincing" evidence?
The decision below directly conflicts with the
decisions of the Sixth Circuit and Board of Immigra-
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tion Appeals ("BIA") on this issue, with the lower
court holding that both standard formulations
equate to the intermediate degree of proof found in
civil law, and the Sixth Circuit and BIA holding that
adding "unequivocal" creates a higher standard, one
that dispels all doubt.
The "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" formulation is the evidentiary standard immigration
courts must apply every day. Where on the spectrum
of proof this standard lies is therefore crucial to the
uniform and just application of our immigration
laws. For example, this is the standard for establishing an immigration court's jurisdiction—immigration
courts do not have jurisdiction over U.S. citizens—
and therefore as a threshold matter in every removal
proceeding, the government must establish that the
individual it seeks to remove is an "alien" over whom
the court has jurisdiction by "clear, unequivocal, and
convincing" evidence. But immigration courts routinely assert jurisdiction over U.S. citizens in error
by finding the government met its burden of proving
alienage. Immigration courts also commonly order
these U.S. citizens removed by finding the government met its burden to prove inadmissibility by
"clear, unequivocal, and convincing" evidence. Thus,
even before the circuit split created by the decision
below, immigration judges were unsure of how
exacting a standard "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" is, and now that there is a clear disruption of
national uniformity on this issue, the errant deportation of U.S. citizens will only persist and increase in
frequency.
The second question presented asks whether a
court of appeals may review a district courts citizenship finding de novo, or is the court of appeals lim-
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ited to clear error? Given the disturbing number of
U.S. citizens detained and deported errantly based
on judicial findings that they are "aliens" by "clear,
unequivocal, and convincing" evidence, the resolution
of what standard of review the appellate court should
apply is critical, not only because de novo review
would provide an additional safeguard against errant
removal of U.S. citizens, but also because of the
importance of the uniform and just application of the
law regarding U.S. citizenship.
The Court should grant the writ to resolve
whether "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" is the
same as "clear and convincing" proof, and to clarify
what standard of review the court of appeals is to
apply when reviewing a district court's citizenship
determination. Not only are these issues affecting
our most precious right, but by granting the writ,
this Court will reduce the widespread harm errantly
deported U.S. citizens and their families endure
when their U.S. citizenship is not adequately safeguarded.
THE COURT SHOULD GRANT THE WRIT.
The questions presented implicate (A) the
"precious right" of U.S. citizenship guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment and (B) the "severe consequences" citizens endure when the government strips
them of their previously recognized citizenship.
Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 269 (1961)
("American citizenship is a precious right. Severe
consequences may attend its loss . . . ."). What evidentiary burden must the government meet when
challenging a prior citizenship determination? And
what standard of review does the court of appeals
apply when reviewing a de novo district court citizenship determination?
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This Court has repeatedly recognized that
these are issues of incredible importance, for the
proper administration of the law affecting citizenship
impacts "the whole nature of our Government . . . ."
See, e.g., Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 353
(1960) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665,
666 (1944) ("We brought the case here because it
raises important issues in the proper administration
of the law affecting naturalized citizens."); Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 120 (1943)
(same).
The Court has repeatedly addressed related
issues to ensure that the appropriate safeguards are
uniformly applied to protect U.S. citizens from being
detained and deported in error, and this Court
should do so again here by granting certiorari.
A.

U.S. citizenship is a fundamental right
that goes to the heart of our democracy,
and therefore it is critical that the Court
clarify what constitutionally required judicial safeguards exist to ensure our government does not deport U.S. citizens.
"Precious." Costello, 365 U.S. at 269.

Worth an "intangible value," Cotton Petroleum
Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 189 (1989), that
"would be difficult to exaggerate . . . ." Schneiderman, 320 U.S. at 122.
"The highest hope of civilized man." Id.
Americans' "most basic right." Perez v.
Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64 (1958) (Warren, C.J.,
dissenting).
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This is how this Court has described only one
right conferred by the Constitution—U.S. citizenship—and rightfully so: citizenship is a critical
component of our Republic, for it is U.S. citizens
alone who give the government power. Foley v.
Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 296, 297 (1978) (observing "a
democratic society is ruled by its people" and "the
right to govern is reserved to citizens"); Decl. of
Independence ("Governments are instituted among
Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of
the governed."); Times Editorial Board, Why U.S.
Citizenship Matters, L.A. Times (Oct. 19, 2014),
http://tinyurl.com/gqs6wuj (opining that citizenship
is important not just because of the certainty, stability, and a sense of empowerment that come with the
rights it confers, but also because it requires citizens
to invest in our government through civic duties,
such as voting, jury duty, and service in public office,
all of which are necessary to a self-governing commonwealth).
A key aspect of self-governance is that the
government cannot lightly take away the precious
right of citizenship—whether through denaturalization, expatriation, or the deportation proceedings
instituted against a person who claims U.S. citizenship. Schneiderman, 320 U.S. at 125 (finding citizenship "rights once conferred should not be lightly
revoked" through denaturalization); Woodby v. INS,
385 U.S. 276, 286 (1966) (adopting the denaturalization standard of proof established in Schneiderman
in all deportation cases because the "immediate
hardship of deportation is often greater than that
inflicted by denaturalization, which does not, immediately at least, result in expulsion from our shores").
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This Court has consistently recognized the
importance of this right (1) by consistently granting
certiorari in cases implicating citizenship, (2) by
repeatedly holding that the government must prove
its case with "clear, unequivocal, and convincing
evidence" which does not leave "the issue in doubt"
when citizenship is at stake, and (3) by permitting de
novo appellate review of citizenship determinations.
See, e.g., United States v. Minker, 350 U.S. 179, 197
(1956) (concurring opinion) ("When we deal with
citizenship we tread on sensitive ground"); Chaunt,
364 U.S. at 353 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citing Schneiderman, 320 U.S. at 125, 158, and
Baumgartner, 322 U.S. at 670); Woodby, 385 U.S. at
286 (holding that "no deportation order may be
entered unless it is found by clear, unequivocal, and
convincing evidence that the facts alleged as grounds
for deportation are true"); Baumgartner, 322 U.S. at
671 ("Suffice it to say that emphasis on the importance of 'clear, unequivocal, and convincing' proof"
in denaturalization cases "would be lost if the ascertainment by the lower courts whether that exacting
standard of proof had been satisfied on the whole
record were to be deemed a 'fact' of the same order as
all other 'facts,' not open to review here") (citation
omitted).
Indeed, this Court has found that citizenship
is a right as important as life itself, a point emphasized by this Court's holding that the government's
standard of proof when citizenship is at stake is
"substantially identical with that required in criminal cases—proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 611-12 (1949)
(citation omitted); see also Fedorenko v. United
States, 449 U.S. 490, 505-506 (1981) (citation omit-
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ted) ("Any less exacting standard would be inconsistent with the importance of the right that is at
stake"); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284
(1922) ("To deport one who so claims to be a citizen,
obviously deprives him of liberty, . . . [and] [i]t may
result also in loss of both property and life; or of all
that makes life worth living").
The heightened burden of proof and de novo
appellate review of citizenship determinations safeguard all Americans, including those the government
has expressly recognized as citizens, from being
subjected to "a fate of ever-increasing fear and distress," never knowing "when and for what cause his
existence in his native land may be terminated," and
"[h]e may be subject to banishment, a fate universally decried by civilized people." See, e.g., Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958) (finding the Eight
Amendment prohibits the use of denationalization as
punishment).
Given the extreme importance of citizenship to
our Republic, the Court should grant certiorari to
clarify what safeguards exist to protect one's citizenship from errant termination and subsequent banishment.
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B.

The circuit split created by the decision
below disrupts the uniform meaning of
"clear, unequivocal, and convincing" evidence, a legal standard that not only
arises in numerous contexts every day,
but also affects countless U.S. citizens,
noncitizens, and their families.

The "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" evidentiary standard is at play in numerous contexts
countless times every day across the country, including in the denaturalization context, as referenced
above, in addition to (1) the immigration removal
context (2) the contested U.S. citizenship context,
and (3) federal legislation; it therefore (4) impacts
countless U.S. citizens and their families.
For these reasons, it is imperative that the
Court resolve what this standard means and what
level of review circuit courts afford lower courts'
finding of whether that standard is met. Is "clear,
unequivocal, and convincing" the same as "clear and
convincing" as the Ninth Circuit found in MondacaVega, 808 F.3d at 415? Or does "the omission of
'unequivocal' make[] a difference," as the Sixth
Circuit and Board of Immigration Appeals have
held? See Ward v. Holder, 733 F.3d 601, 605 (2013);
Matter of Patel, 19 I&N Dec. 774, 783 (1988) ("[T]he
clear and convincing standard imposes a lower
burden than the clear, unequivocal, and convincing
standard . . . because it does not require that the
evidence be unequivocal or of such a quality as to
dispel all doubt") (citations omitted). Put slightly
differently: Is "[t]he 'clear, unequivocal, and convincing standard' . . . a more demanding degree of proof
than the 'clear and convincing' standard"? Ward, 733
F.3d at 605. The Court's answer to this question is
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critical to the uniform and just application of our
laws implicating U.S. citizenship.
1. "Clear, Unequivocal, and Convincing"
Evidence in the Immigration Removal
Context.
Immigration judges have jurisdiction over
noncitizens or "aliens" only, and therefore, at the
outset of every removal proceeding, the government
must establish the individual's "alienage" by "clear,
unequivocal, and convincing" evidence. United States
ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 153 (1923)
("[A]lienage is a jurisdictional fact; . . . an order of
deportation must be predicated upon a finding of
that fact."), overruled on other grounds by INS v.
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984); RamonSepulveda v. INS, 743 F.2d 1307, 1308 n. 2 (9th Cir.
1984) (holding that the government must prove
alienage by "clear, convincing, and unequivocal
evidence").
In fiscal year 2015 alone, immigration judges
found the government met this "exacting" standard
in over 124,500 cases. See, e.g., Dep't of Homeland
Sec., DHS Releases End of Fiscal Year 2015 Statistics [hereinafter "DHS Press Release"] (Dec. 22,
2015), http://tinyurl.com/prkj8dd (reporting that in
fiscal year 2015, the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") removed 462,463 individuals from the
U.S.); see also John F. Simanski, Immigration Enforcement Actions: 2013, Dep't of Homeland Sec.
Annual Rep't, 1-2, (Sept. 2014), http://tinyurl.
com/gwc4de2 (reporting that in fiscal year 2013, the
most recent fiscal year itemizing DHS removals,
approximately 73 percent (337,598) of all removals
were through expedited and reinstated orders of
removal—through which noncitizens are removed
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"without a hearing before an immigration judge"—
and therefore the remaining 27 percent of individuals removed (about 124,865) appeared before an
immigration judge before being removed).
Despite the frequency with which immigration
judges must apply this evidentiary standard, immigration judges are apparently unsure of its meaning,
a conclusion supported by the fact that immigration
judges routinely find jurisdiction over U.S. citizens,
but then go on to order them removed. See Problems
with ICE Interrogation, Detention, and Removal
Procedures: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security and
International Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
110th Cong. (2008) [hereinafter "Rep't"], available at
http://tinyurl.com/jjmsrfr (2008 testimony of amicus,
Att'y Kara Hartzler).
For example, in 2008, amicus FIRRP's then
legal director, Attorney Kara Hartzler, testified
before Congress that "the numbers I personally am
seeing border on routine deportation and detention of
U.S. citizens." Id. This problem has persisted. Recent
empirical research shows that DHS improperly
detains approximately 2,500 U.S. citizens every year,
and immigration judges errantly order the removal
of some of those individuals. See Jacqueline Stevens,
Detaining and Deporting U.S. Citizens as Aliens, 18
Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 613 n.17, 618, 630 (2011)
(observing that the actual number of U.S. citizens
deported is unknowable due largely to DHS's policy
"not to maintain records of U.S. citizens [it] has
detained or deported," and reporting that based on
her groundbreaking empirical research, "[Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE"), an agency
within DHS,] has incarcerated over 20,000 U.S.
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citizens, and deported thousands more" from 2003 to
2011); see also William Finnegan, The Deportation
Machine [hereinafter "Finnegan"], The New Yorker
(April 29, 2013), http:// tinyurl.com/ncpkyea (citing
Northwestern political science professor Jacqueline
Stevens and reporting that about one percent of the
"tens of thousands" of immigration detainees are
U.S. citizens).
This data shows that immigration judges are
not holding the government to the exacting "clear,
unequivocal, and convincing" standard for establishing alienage; the lack of uniformity among the circuits the decision below created regarding the meaning of this standard will only increase the likelihood
of the errant deportation of citizens. Given that "U.S.
citizens are [already] being detained and deported
from the United States not monthly or weekly, but
on a daily basis," the Court should immediately
clarify the standard immigration judges use to
establish their jurisdiction in all removal hearings in
this country. See Rep't, available at http://tinyurl.
com/jjmsrfr (2008 testimony of amicus, Att'y Kara
Harzler).
2. "Clear, Unequivocal, and Convincing"
Evidence in the Context of Contested
U.S. Citizenship Cases.
When an individual like Petitioner appeals his
removal order to a circuit court by claiming U.S.
citizenship, the court of appeals must determine
whether there are genuine issues of material fact
regarding the citizenship claim. 8 U.S.C. §
1252(b)(5)(B). If there are, the court must transfer
the citizenship issue to a district court for a de novo
hearing on this issue. Id.
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In the Ninth Circuit, the federal court jurisdiction with the largest number of individuals in removal proceedings, the "clear, unequivocal, and
convincing" evidentiary standard comes into play
twice in these de novo district court alienage hearings. See DHS Press Release, n.1 (Dec. 22, 2015),
http://tinyurl.com/prkj8dd. First, if the government
offers proof of the individual's foreign birth, a rebuttable presumption of alienage arises, which the
individual may rebut with substantial credible
evidence of citizenship, thereby shifting the burden
back to the government to ultimately prove alienage
by "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" evidence.
Ayala-Villanueva v. Holder, 572 F.3d 736, 737 n.3
(9th Cir. 2009). Second, as in removal proceedings,
the government "bears the ultimate burden of establishing all facts supporting deportability by clear,
unequivocal, and convincing evidence." Chau v. INS,
247 F.3d 1026, 1029 n.5 (9th Cir. 2001).
The Second and Third Circuits are the only
other circuit courts with decisions addressing the
evidentiary standard in de novo district court hearings on alienage; both circuits also require "clear,
unequivocal, and convincing" evidence of alienage.
McConney v. INS, 429 F.2d 626, 628 (2d Cir. 1970);
see also United States. v. Ghaloub, 385 F.2d 567, 570
(2d Cir. 1966) (placing initial burden of proving
citizenship on individual, and shifting burden to the
government if individual shows a prior governmental
determination establishing his citizenship and
requiring government to prove expatriation or the
prior citizenship determination was in error by
"clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence");
Johnson v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 235 F. App'x 24, 40
(3d Cir. 2007) (placing initial burden of proof on
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individual, then shifting the burden to the government rebut presumption of citizenship with "clear,
unequivocal, and convincing" evidence) (citing Delmore v. Brownell, 236 F.2d 598, 600 (3d Cir.1956)).
Given that some circuit courts, like the lower
court here, do not permit de novo review of the
findings reached by the district court in alienage
determinations, including whether the government
satisfied its burden to provide "clear, unequivocal,
and convincing" evidence of alienage, it is critical
that the Court clarify and create uniformity regarding the meaning of this standard, which directly
affects one's precious right of citizenship. Indeed, the
appeal of at least one district court's alienage determination is currently pending before the Ninth
Circuit. See Boateng v. Lynch, No. 11-72044 (9th
Cir.).
3. "Clear, Unequivocal, and Convincing"
Evidence in Federal Legislation.
The "question of what degree of proof is required" in a proceeding "is the kind of question which
has traditionally been left to the judiciary to resolve .
. . ." Woodby, 385 U.S. at 284. However, Congress
often amends statutes in response to this Court's
construction of a statute, including its holdings
regarding the appropriate degree of proof. See Rivers
v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 313 (1994)
("Congress, of course, has the power to amend a
statute that it believes we have misconstrued.");
Ward, 733 F.3d at 604.
For example, in Woodby, this Court held for
the first time that the government must establish
deportability with "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" evidence. 385 U.S. at 277. In 1996, however,
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Congress amended the Immigration and Nationality
Act ("INA") to reflect that "in cases of deportable
aliens" (as opposed to "inadmissible" aliens), the
government's evidentiary burden is "clear and convincing," not Woodby's "clear, unequivocal, and
convincing." Yet, in the same section of the INA,
Congress incorporated a different evidentiary degree
of proof by requiring "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" evidence in absentia cases. 8 U.S.C. §
1229a(b)(5)(A).
Under the cardinal rules of statutory construction, courts must "give effect to each word in a statute," Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 12 (2004), and
"avoid a reading which renders some words altogether redundant," Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561,
574 (1995). But the lower court's decision equates the
two standards. This forces courts within the lower
court's jurisdiction to violate these cardinal rules of
statutory construction by rendering Congress' use of
"unequivocal" meaningless or redundant. Thus,
regardless of whether this Court originally intended
to create two different evidentiary standards in
Schneiderman, Congress has created two evidentiary
formulations. This Court's clarification is therefore
needed by (1) courts that must apply this standard
on a daily basis, (2) the agency in its interpretation
of two separate standards enunciated by Congress,
and (3) Congress, so it may accurately legislate its
intent and amend the INA as necessary.
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4. The Circuit Split Created By the Lower Court's Decision Regarding the
Meaning of "Clear, Unequivocal, and
Convincing" Evidence Affects Countless U.S. Citizens and Their Families.
The fact that immigration judges are not only
erroneously asserting jurisdiction over U.S. citizens
by finding "clear, unequivocal, and convincing"
evidence of their "alienage," but also ordering them
deported shows that even before the circuit split
created by the decision below, immigration judges
are grappling with how "exacting" this degree of
proof is. See Rept., available at http://tinyurl.
com/jjmsrfr (2008 testimony of amicus, Att'y Kara
Hartzler) ("U.S. citizens are being detained and
deported from the United States not monthly or
weekly, but on a daily basis."). Given that immigration courts will now begin holding the government to
different evidentiary burdens based on the same
standard formulation, the occurrence of errant U.S.
citizens' deportation will only increase.
The following are scenarios and real-life stories that, in amicus's experience, are representative
of the catastrophic effect the confusion over the
meaning of the "clear, unequivocal, and convincing"
standard has on all U.S. citizens and their family
members. The Court should not only clarify the
government's evidentiary burden, but it should also
create national uniformity regarding the court of
appeals' standard of review of a district court's
alienage determinations.
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a. The "Clear, Unequivocal, and Convincing"
Standard Impacts All Children Born
Abroad to Married U.S. Citizen Parents.
As previously addressed, in removal proceedings and in de novo district court alienage hearings,
the government can create a presumption of alienage
by providing evidence of the individual's foreign
birth, such as a foreign birth certificate or passport.
The burden then shifts to the individual claiming
U.S. citizenship who must rebut this presumption of
alienage with substantial credible evidence of U.S.
citizenship. If the individual provides sufficient
evidence, the burden shifts back to the government
to provide "clear, unequivocal, and convincing"
evidence of alienage.
Thousands of children are born abroad every
year, for example to married U.S. citizens serving as
missionaries and to U.S. military service menbers
stationed overseas with their families. These foreignborn children are U.S. citizens at birth. 8 U.S.C. §
1401(c). They are issued a U.S. passport, but they
are not formally adjudicated as U.S. citizens. These
children are in a position similar to Petitioner in this
regard.
Consequently, these foreign-born U.S. citizens
face a higher risk of errant deportation than U.S.
citizens born in the U.S. because, if wrongly placed
in removal proceedings, these children would be
required to rebut a presumption of alienage. Given
that "7 percent of U.S. citizens do not have ready
access to proof of their citizenship such as a U.S.
Passport, naturalization papers, or a birth certificate"—a figure that increases to 12 percent among
U.S. citizens who make less than $25,000 per year—
it is extremely likely that children born abroad to
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U.S. citizen parents could be errantly deported since
they have even less documentary proof of U.S. citizenship by virtue of having no U.S. birth certificate
and no naturalization paperwork. See Rep't, available at http://tinyurl.com/jjmsrfr (testimony of Rachel
E. Rosenblookm, Human Rights Fellow, Center for
Human Rights and Int'l Justice at Boston College).
The Court should create uniformity regarding
the government's evidentiary burden when proving
alienage.
b. Thomas Warziniack's story illustrates how
critical the uniform and just application of
the "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" evidentiary standard is to prevent the errant
detention of U.S. citizens.
Amicus FIRRP regularly represents U.S. citizens errantly detained after being placed in removal
proceedings. One such client was Thomas Warziniack, a Minnesota-born, Georgia-raised U.S. citizen
with a mental illness and heroin addiction who was
errantly detained as an unlawfully present noncitizen. After law enforcement arrested him on a minor
drug charge in Colorado, he told them that he had
been shot seven times, stabbed twice, and bombed
four times as a Russian army colonel in Afghanistan
before he swam to America from a Russian submarine. Despite having evidence of his U.S. citizenship
in their records, these law enforcement officers
notified immigration authorities of Mr. Warziniack's
unlawful presence. Removal proceedings were then
instituted and he was trasferred to a detention
facility in Florence, Arizona.
Because Mr. Warziniak was detained, "he did
not have access to his birth certificate; nor did he
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have any family or friends who could obtain a copy.
Rep't, available at http://tinyurl.com/jjmsrfr (testimony of amicus, Att'y Kara Hartzler). "He had heard
it cost $30 to order a copy of his birth certificate, so
he was working in the prison kitchen for a dollar a
day until he had the money to order one. So far, he
had $8 and he hoped to earn the remaining $22
before his next court date in several weeks." Id.
Mr. Warziniak was eventually able to obtain a
copy of his birth certificate and prove his citizenship,
thereby preventing his deportation, but "[e]ven now,
the prison records inaccurately show his current
location as 'the Soviet Union.'" Marisa Taylor, Immigration Officials Detaining, Deporting American
Citizens, McClatchyDC (Jan. 28, 2008), http://tinyurl.
com/gsbxntz.
In amicus's experience, stories like Mr.
Warziniak's are not rare. For example, in 2008,
amicus had an average of "40 to 50 cases per month
in which individuals with potentially valid claims to
U.S. citizenship [we]re being detained and deported."
Rep't, available at http:// tinyurl.com/jjmsrfr (2008
testimony of amicus, Att'y Kara Hartzler). While
somewhat less common now than in 2008, amicus
continues to see individuals with potentially valid
claims to U.S. citizenship being placed in removal
proceedings, detained, and deported on a regular
basis. These citizens often belong to racial and ethnic
minorities, or are mentally ill, homeless, indigent, or
without the family or monetary means to obtain the
necessary documents to prove their citizenship. It is
therefore crucial that immigration courts not only
uniformly apply the "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" evidentiary burden when determining alienage—the threshold to establishing jurisdiction—but
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also understand precisely where on the spectrum of
proof this standard lies. By granting certiorari in this
case, the Court can accomplish both of these important goals.
c. Mark Lyttle's story illustrates that clarification and uniform application of the
"clear, unequivocal, and convincing" standard is necessary to prevent the errant deportation of U.S. citizens.
Unlike Mr. Warziniak, who was able to obtain
evidence of his U.S. citizenship prior to being removed, Mark Lyttle, a North Carolina-born U.S.
citizen, was not. See Finnegan, The New Yorker
(April 29, 2013), http:// tinyurl.com/ncpkyea. Like
Mr. Warziniak and many other U.S. citizens errantly
placed in removal proceedings, Mr. Lyttle has cognitive problems. Id. "He can read, but writes with
difficulty." Id. He was in mental institutions, jails,
and group homes for much of his adolescence and
young adulthood. Id.
When he was incarcerated for misdemeanor
assault, the clerk completing Mr. Lyttle's intake form
mistakenly listed "Mexico" as his place of birth and
"Alien" as his citizenship status. Id. However, Mr.
Lyttle speaks no Spanish and has no familial ties to
Mexico. Stevens, Detaining and Deporting U.S.
Citizens as Aliens, 18 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. at 674.
During numerous ICE interviews, Mr. Lyttle repeatedly claimed he was born in the U.S, yet was still
placed in removal proceedings. Finnegan, The New
Yorker (April 29, 2013), http:// tinyurl.com/ncpkyea.
Although he told the immigration judge twice
that he was a U.S. citizen, the judge still ordered him
deported. Id. "He later told an interviewer, 'I was
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going to appeal until I found out that it would be six
months to two years before I’d have a chance, and,
even if I did that, they still wouldn’t believe me.'" Id.
He found the detention center so intolerable that he
had already attempted suicide once. Id.
After he was ordered removed, ICE flew Mr.
Lyttle in handcuffs and shackles to Hidalgo, Texas
where he was left with "only the green prison outfit
he had on when ICE picked him up six weeks earlier
in North Carolina" and a deportation order for "Jose
Thomas." Stevens, Detaining and Deporting U.S.
Citizens as Aliens, 18 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. at 674.
He was then instructed to walk across a bridge to
Reynosa, Mexico. Id. Meanwhile, Mr. Lyttle's family
searched for their missing son, "contacting the jails
and hospitals they knew, and even checking the
obituaries." Finnegan, The New Yorker (April 29,
2013), http://tinyurl.com/ ncpkyea.
When Mr. Lyttle tried to reenter the U.S.,
border patrol officers threatened him with prison
time. Stevens, Detaining and Deporting U.S. Citizens
as Aliens, 18 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. at 675. He spent
the next "four and a half months in shelters, immigration camps, and a jail in Mexico, Honduras,
Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala." Id.
Mr. Lyttle attempted to reenter the U.S. two
more times. Id. He was refused reentry the first
time, and the second time resulted in an Expedited
Removal Order based on falsely misrepresenting
himself as a U.S. citizen. Id. He eventually obtained
a U.S. passport through the help of a consular office
and was allowed to reenter the U.S., but his records
still do not correctly identify him as a U.S. citizen.
Id. at 676. For example, he was later "detained in the
Atlanta airport en route to see his brother, a soldier
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based in Kentucky," and was nearly deported to
Mexico again based on a third Expedited Removal
Order. Id. This was prevented at the eleventh hour,
however, when an ICE agent realized the error. Id.
The lower court's decision disrupts uniformity
of the already murky degree of proof that is supposed
to prevent immigration courts from asserting jurisdiction over U.S. citizens and thereby ensuring that
U.S. citizens are never removed from their country.
The Court should grant certiorari to restore and
clarify this important evidentiary standard to ensure
more cases like Mr. Lyttle's do not occur.
d. Peter Guzman's story illustrates the severe,
long-term suffering errantly deported U.S.
citizens and their families endure.
Peter Guzman is a U.S. citizen who was born
in Los Angeles, California. Rept. (testimony of James
J. Brosnahan, Att'y for Mr. Guzman). Like Mr.
Warziniak and Mr. Lyttle, Mr. Guzman is a person of
limited mental capacity," and at the age of 30, he had
"about a second grade reading ability." Id. In 2007,
he was incarcerated in county jail for 40 days on a
trespassing charge, during which immigration officials "interviewed him and asked if he was a citizen,"
even though both ICE and the sheriff's office had
records of Mr. Guzman's U.S. citizenship. Id. ("They
had [evidence of Mr. Guzman's citizenship] in their
computers, but they didn't look, evidently, so they
say . . . ."); Paloma Esquivel, Suit Filed Over Man's
Deportation Ordeal [hereinafter "Esquivel"], L.A.
Times (Feb. 28, 2008), http://tinyurl.com/pgkx38l.
During these interviews, Mr. Guzman repeatedly stated that he was a U.S. citizen. Rep't, available at http://tinyurl.com/jjmsrfr (testimony of Mr.
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Brosnahan). He also "complained of hearing voices
while in custody, and was prescribed anti-psychotic
medication." See Esquivel, L.A. Times (Feb. 28,
2008), http://tinyurl.com/pgkx38l (reporting the
allegations set forth in Mr. Guzman's lawsuit).
However, Mr. Guzman eventually agreed to
the interviewing agent's repeated suggestion that he
was actually born in Mexico, like his parents were,
and was therefore not a citizen. Rep't, available at
http://tinyurl.com/jjmsrfr (testimony of Mr. Brosnahan) ("And [the interviewing agent] said, But your
parents were born in Mexico, you can't be a citizen,
and sent him back to a holding cell and then brought
him back again.").
ICE then "put him on a bus with $3, [and]
[t]hey took him to Tijuana." Id. And "[f]or three
months, he tried to get back into his country . . . ." Id.
For three months, "[h]e had to eat out of garbage
cans. He had to wash himself in the Tijuana River."
Id. He was able to call his mother once, but before he
could tell her exactly where in Tijuana he was, the
line was cut. Jacqueline Stevens, Thin ICE, The
Nation (June 5, 2008), http://tinyurl.com/j6ncbtp.
His mother went to Tijuana to find him; she
wandered the streets, left fliers with his photo at the
morgue, hospitals, churches, and shelters. Esquivel,
L.A. Times (Feb. 28, 2008), http://tinyurl.com/
pgkx38l (reporting the allegations in Mr. Guzman's
lawsuit). "When her money ran out after three days,
she slept in the closet-sized backroom of a banana
warehouse, where she was allowed to stay in exchange for cooking for the warehouse workers,
according to the suit." Id.
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Mr. Guzman was finally permitted to return;
however, he is now "terrified of strangers and has
been unable to return to work," and the problems he
had before have worsened. Id. He no longer speaks,
and his mother must accompany him when he goes
out in public. Id.
By clarifying the degree of proof required to
prove alienage, the Court will immediately curb the
daily occurrence of wrongful deportations of U.S.
citizens and prevent additional stories of needlesssuffering like that of Mr. Guzman and his family.
Clarification will also restore the just and uniform
application of immigration laws, thereby preventing
stories of suffering like Mr. Guzman's from increasing in frequency. Finally, these issues directly implicate the precious right of U.S. citizenship, and therefore are eminently deserving of this Court's consideration.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should
grant the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari.
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